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Recent Developments

Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd.:
Accident Victim's Estate May Recover Damages for Pre-Impact Fright if a Jury is
Capable of Making an Objective Determination that the Victim Experienced
Anguish and Distress Before Impending Death
By Catherine Bowers

I

n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland addressed whether the
estate of an accident victim may be
awarded damages in a survival action
when the victim, who died immediately
upon impact, experienced pre-impact
fright. Beynon v. Montgomery
Cablevision Ltd. , 351 Md. 460, 718
A.2d 1161 (1998). The court held
that when a decedent experiences
great anxiety and fear of imminent
death immediately prior to the fatal
physical impact, the decedent's estate
may recover for emotional distress and
mental anguish that can be measured
by an objective determination.
In the early morning of June 8,
1990, Montgomery Cablevision
Limited Partnership was installing
replacement cable on Interstate 495
("capital beltway"). Beynon, 351
Md. at 464, 718 A.2d at 1163.
Montgomery Cable coordinated with
the Maryland State Police to have
traffic on the capital beltway stopped
during the cable replacement. Id.
During the repair, traffic backed up
one mile on both sides of the capital
beltway. Id. James P. Kirkland
("Kirkland") was at the end of the
traffic congestion in his tractor-trailer.
!d. Kirkland testified that his trailer
was stopped in a middle lane, and that
there was traffic on both sides ofhim.

Id.
At the same time, Douglas K.
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Beynon ("Beynon") was traveling at
55 m.p.h. in the same direction as
Kirkland. Id. at 464-65, 718 A.2d
at 1163. Beynon was approximately
192 feet behind Kirkland's tractortrailer when he realized he was going
to crash. Id. at 465, 718 A.2d at
1163. Beynon slammed on his brakes
and veered to the right. Id. However,
Beynon was unable to stop his vehicle,
hit the rear of Kirkland' s trailer, and
was killed on impact. Id.
In the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Beynon's
parents contended that Beynon
suffered and should be compensated
for pre-impact fright, which was
defined as "the mental anguish the
decedent suffered from the time he
became aware ofthe impending crash
until the collision." Id. at 465, 718
A.2d at 1164. Beynon's parents
presented the seventy-one and a half
feet of skid marks to prove that
Beynon reacted to the imminent
danger of crashing. Id. at 465, 718
A.2d at 1163. The trial court agreed
that the parents presented sufficient
evidence of pre-impact fright and
instructed the jury that it could make
an award for pain, suffering, and
mental anguish. !d. at 465-66, 718
A.2d at 1164. The jury returned a
verdict for the petitioners, and
awarded $1 ,000,000.00 to Beynon's
estate for pre-impact fright. Id. at
466, 718 A.2d at 1164. The court

reduced the award to $350,000
pursuant to section 11-1 08(b) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Annotated Code of
Maryland. Id. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed the
judgment for post-impact fright,
concluding that a cause of action
based only on fright cannot stand
without physical injury to the victim
or an injury capable of objective
determination. Id. at 467-69, 718
A.2d at 1164-65 (citing

Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. v.
Beynon, 116 Md. App. 363, 388,
696 A.2d 491, 503 (1997)). The
intermediate appellate court stated
that damages for pre-impact fright
cannot be awarded when a victim
dies on impact or never regains
consciousness. Id. at 469, 718 A.3d
at 1165 (citing Montgomery
Cablevision Ltd., 116 Md. App. at
388,696 A.2d at 503). The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari, reversed the court of
special appeals and remanded the
case with instructions to reinstate the
trial court's judgment. Id. at 509,718
A.2d at 1185.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by reviewing case law from
jurisdictions that allow the recovery
of pre-impact fright damages and
jurisdictions that do not allow such
damages. !d. at 476-97, 718 A.2d
at 1169-79. Following this review,
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the court determined that the cases
upholding an award of damages for
pre-impact fright were more
persuasive and compatible with
Marylandlaw. Id. at 497, 718 A.2d
at 1179.
The court next summarized
Maryland law involving issues
regarding recovery for emotional
injury. Id. at 497 -504, 718 A.2d at
1179-83. The court concluded that
damages for emotional distress are
recoverable in Maryland under two
circumstances. Id. at 504-05, 718
A.2d at 1183. First, damages are
recoverable when the emotional
distress is proximately caused by the
defendant's wrongful act and results
in a physical injury. Id. (citing Green
v. TA. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md.
69, 77, 73 A. 688, 691 (1909».
Second, damages are recoverable
when the emotional distress is capable
of being determined in an objective
manner. Id. (citing Vance v. Vance,
286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728,
733 (1979». Significantly, the court
noted that this standard for recovery
of damages for emotional distress
chronologically varies the common
law chain of events - wrongful fact,
physical impact, physical injury and
then emotional distress, for such
recovery. !d. at 505, 718 A.2d at
1183. Thus, the court introduced a
more flexible and accommodating
sequence of events for recovery of
emotional damages. Id. The court
concluded, given the new
accommodating sequence of events,
that the compensability of pre-impact
fright is permissible "when it is the
proximate result ofa wrongful act and
it produces a physical injury or is

manifested in some objective form."
Id.
Physical injury, the court
stressed, provides the objective
manifestation ofthe emotional injury
and serves "as the yardstick by which
a tort victim's emotional harm may be
measured." Id.at507, 718A.2dat
1184. In the present case, the court
explained, Beynon's fright was
accompanied by physical injuries, the
injuries that caused his death. Id. The
court also stated that Beynon's fright
was also accompanied by an
independent objective manifestation
of emotional distress and mental
anguish. Id. The court concluded
that Beynon's fright was capable of
objective determination by the
seventy-one and a half feet of skid
marks that resulted from his
apprehension of impending death. Id.
Again discussing the sequence·
of events and proximate cause of
harm, the court stressed that the fact
that Beynon's fright occurred before
the crash that resulted in his fatal
injuries did not affect causation. Id.
A wrongful act need only proximately
cause mental anguish, and this mental
disturbance does not need to be the
result of physical injury. Id. Thus,
the court opined, the respondent was
responsible for the emotional
disturbance Beynon experienced due
to the crash. Id.
In addition, the court reasoned
that considering the purpose of
survival statutes is to permit a
decedent's estate to bring an action
that the decedent would have brought
had he lived, refusing to allow
Beynon's estate to recover pre-impact
fright damages in this survival action

would be illogical. Id. at 508, 718
A.2dat 1185. HadBeynonlived,he
no doubt would have been permitted
to recover damages for the preimpact fright he suffered before hitting
the tractor-trailer. Id.
The court next addressed the
issue ofpermitting a jury to determine
pre-impact fright. Id. The court
concluded that the jury determination
required the jury to use the same
reasoning and common knowledge it
would be permitted to use if it were
determining non-economic damages
such as pain and suffering. Id.
Furthermore, the court explained that
the jury only needs evidence from
which they could reasonably infer that
the decedent experienced fright. !d.
The court opined that in the present
case, the jury could have reasonably
inferred from the seventy-one and a
half foot skid marks that Beynon was
aware of the impending crash and
tried to avoid it. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Wilner disagreed with the majority
determination that the existence of
fright could be measured by seventyone and a half feet of skid marks. Id.
at 509-10, 718 A.2d at 1185-86.
Judge Wilner stated that the case
lacked any substantial evidence from
which a jury could infer that Beynon
was consciously experiencing fright
while trying to stop his vehicle. Id. at
511,718 A.2d at 1186. According
to Judge Wilner, it was "rank
speculation" for a jury to conclude that
Beynon was consciously thinking
about anything other than trying to
avoid hitting the trailer. Id. Judge
Wilner also expressed great concern
over the amount per second of
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damages awarded in the case, which
was $140,000 per second of fright.
Id. at 512, 718 A.2d at 1187.
Significantly, in Beynon v.
Montgomery Cablevision Ltd, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
recognized an action for pre-impact
fright when the impact causes
instantaneous death. As a result of
this decision, when a plaintiff offers
evidence that provides an objective
determination ofthe distress suffered
by the decedent, his or her estate may
recover for the suffering. The court's
holding permits juries to infer the
decedent's fright from the evidence
presented. The effect ofthis case will
add to the unchecked speculation and
conjecture in Maryland'sjury rooms.
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